Operation Steinbock

[Dave Hendrikman]

Hello everybody,

I am very interested in Operation 'Steinbock', the last series of Luftwaffe raids against the British Isles, and because there is no dedicated book on this operation, I've started a thread on this subject over on the Luftwaffe Experten Message Board. A lot of information has already come up.

So far, this is what we have come up with (summary):

-Small pieces of info in 'Dornier Do-217' by Jerry Scutts (includes several color profiles)

-Small pieces of info in 'German Elite Pathfinders, KG 100 in action', by Manfred Griehl

-Small pieces of info in 'Luftwaffe, The illustrated history of the German Air Force in WWII', by John Pimlott

-a booklet called "The Little Blitz" by Hugh A Halliday which was published in 1986 (Table on German a/c available 20 January, '44 and table on major German raids 21.1 until 29.5, 1944. 29 raids in total)

- "German Bombers over England" by Phillpott (Units and their Aircraft used in "Operation Steinbock" in 1944)

-"Pfadfinder" by Ken Wakefield, from which we have: OOB, as of 21 Jan. 44. The book apparently has 17 pages on Steinbock (pp. 207-223), which we do not have!

-This link: http://www.gsansom.demon.co.uk/vfaero/enigma/bombraid.htm

-B/w images of Heinkel He-177s during 'Steinbock', from "He177-277-274" by Manfred Griehl

-This link:
http://www.checksix-fr.com/albumphoto/photos/im_1068982874.jpg

-This link:
http://www.sweffling.freeserve.co.uk/cavendish.htm

-This link:
http://www.fishponds.freeuk.com/ (extensive info on the 3 Steinbock-raids on Bristol)


Further books with info on 'Steinbock' (believed):

-'German bombers over England, 1940-1944', by Griehl

-'Der Luftkrieg der Europa: Die Operativen Einsätze des Kampfgeschwaders 2 im zweiten Weltkrieg', by Ulf Balke.

-Kampfgeschwader 100 >>Wiking<<: Eine Geschichte aus Kriegstagebüchern, Dokumentation und Berichten 1934-1945, by Ulf Balke

-Geschichte des Kampfgeschwader 54: von der Ju 52 zur Me 262: Eine Chronik nach Kriegstagebüchern, Berichten und Dokumentation 1935-1945, by Siegfried Radtke

Nobody seems to have these last three books, which should contain a lot of info on these main participating units.

Our Lemb-thread can be seen in Lemb->Bombers '39-'45->'Steinbock'

Any additions to the above mentioned info will be greatly appreciated!

Many thanks in advance,

Dave

[Richard T Eger]

From 12 O'Clock High!:

Dunash
Operation Steinbock 1944 mini Blitz
Tue Nov 4 20:41:04 2025
217.132.165.178

The March-April 1944 Operation Steinbock "mini-Blitz" of London achieved minimal results with heavy losses. To escape the British night fighter defences, German crews would already commence their bombing dives from 30,000' over France, arriving over London at 450 mph, dropping their bombs of course with minimal accuracy!

With hindsight, is there any way the the last of the Luftwaffes bombers in the west could have achieved better results over London, or have been used more effectively against less defended targets eg bombing Scapa Flow, or more strategic targets eg Tyne Bridge, Enfield factory, Rolls Royce factory, Southampton D Day build up etc?

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Michael
Re: Operation Steinbock
Wed Nov 5 05:41:42 2025
207.254.27.109

I am away from my sources at the moment, but would like to point out that the information available on this particular operation (not much) seems often contradictory and incomplete.

Especially the overall loss rates put forward vary between
5% and 10% for the entire campaign. That's high, but not worse than what Bomber Command suffered in its darkest hours.

It also must be said that most Luftwaffe Kampfgeschwader crews, at that stage ofthe war, had far less experience than their RAF counterparts, and much worse training. Not to mention the superior centimetric radar of the Allies, their
ability to read Luftwaffe Enigma radio traffic, their general numerical superiority, and the fact that Britain as a target much easier to defend than continental Europe.

All in all, I'd say the Luftwaffe acquited itself fairly well in view of these difficulties. That they didn't hit much shouldn't come as a surprise under the circumstances. Neither did RAF or USAAF on many occassions, in spite of their superior equipment and experience.

"With hindsight, is there any way the the last of the Luftwaffes bombers in the west could have achieved better results over London, or have been used more effectively against less defended targets eg bombing Scapa Flow, or more strategic targets eg Tyne Bridge, Enfield factory, Rolls Royce factory, Southampton D Day build up etc?"

Operation Steinbock was a dedicated retaliation measure against Allied area bombing, so it was directed against whole cities. I doubt the mostly inexperienced bomber crews could have achieved anything worthwhile against point targets like bridges or factories. Allied flak and night fighters over Britain were dangerous enough if all you wanted was to get in and out as quickly as possible.

Attacks against D-Day build-up would have been a very neat idea, especially against the embarcation ports shortly before June 6, but air defences were so tight by then that even single recon planes had little chance of getting near them. The Allied deception memasures also worked very well, and diverted attention away from Normandy, to Norway and the Pas de Calais.

Finally, about that "diving from 30,000 ft" business:

that has been presented as the way the He 177 heavy bombers were used, but I have my doubts. Both the altitude and speed quoted seem unrealistic: the He 177 had no pressurized cabine, and any heavy bomber would have broken up at that kind of speed.

It may have glided down from 26,000 ft, at 360 mph, to attack, and then escaped at low level.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

George Hopp
On He 177 speeds
Wed Nov 5 15:55:31 2025
216.191.233.213

Since the He 177 was stressed for dive bombing, I doubt that a gliding dive would be beyond its capability.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Michael
He 177 Speeds
Wed Nov 5 16:38:24 2025
207.254.27.106

The last line of my message run:
"It may have glided down from 26,000 ft, at 360 mph, to attack, and then escaped at low level."

So maybe our opinions on the operational use of the Greif are in fact not all that different. I objected to the exaggerated figures mentioned in the original posting, not to the gliding attack itself.

For clarification, here are some figures and observations from Cpt. Eric Brown's evaluation of the big Heinkel bomber:

- service ceiling with max. load 22,310 ft
- max. cruise speed 19,700 ft, 258 mph
- max. level top speed 303 mph
- time to climb 19,700 ft 19.8 minutes

- a dive speed of 323 mph created a load of 2 gs on recovery; max. allowable load was 2.3 g.
As the control forces remained very light throughout the dive, it was potentially rather easy to overstress the plane.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

gghopp
Your info sounds reasonable to me (n/t) (nm)
Wed Nov 5 18:50:39 2025
216.191.233.217

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Graham Boak
Comparative ease
Thu Nov 6 15:03:51 2025
20.138.254.2

You omit that Britain, for all its advantages in this period, lacked the space and time to respond in depth to attacks on Southern England. A Bomber Command raid gave the Germans considerable notice before reaching their targets: an equivalent Luftwaffe raid was on top of the defences much more quickly. This made concentration of the scattered defenders much more difficult to achieve - the whole of Britain (some obvious exceptions) had to be defended, so the Luftwaffe could gain the advantage of local concentration of force - there were simply not enough RAF night fighters in any one area in time to inflict massive losses. Though they proved decisive enough.

No doubt RAF tactics would have changed had Steinbock continued for much longer. However, losses comparable to that suffered by Bomber Command at its worst were simply not sustainable by either force.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Michael
Re: Comparative Advantage
Thu Nov 6 16:45:00 2025
207.254.27.196

Dear Graham,

I would suggest that there were several major advantages Britain enjoyed that compensated amply for all geographic influences:

a) Bletchly Park was reading Luftwaffe Enigma messages with ease. In fact, several publications on the subject ("The Code Breakers", "Battle of Wits") point out the Luftwaffe had the weakest codes, and the sloppiest operator discipline, of all German forces.

b) by the time of Operation Steinbock, Chain Home and Chain Home Low had been augmented with new centimetric radar, a technology Germany was unable to copy until very late in the war. If memory serves, the American SCR 548 was one example. This radar was later adapted for the fully automatic laying of heavy anti-aircraft cannon, and used with much success against V-1s. The Luftwaffe could not easily jam a technology it didn't possess.

c) the Mosquito nightfighters were faster, and climbed better, than most of their German counterparts. You are correct about the shorter distances the Luftwaffe had to penetrate into enemy airspace - but this also means the area to be defended was smaller.

d) Finally, we must credit the RAF with developing teactics and technology that negated British airspace to every kind of Luftwaffe sortie - in addition to vast Allied numbers. Even the "tip-and-run" attacks of fast FW 190 fighter bombers became nearly impossible after the introduction of Typhoon and Tempest

"No doubt RAF tactics would have changed had Steinbock continued for much longer. However, losses comparable to that suffered by Bomber Command at its worst were simply not sustainable by either force."

RAF tactics were already quite good. They could have been strengthend with more nocturnal intruder missions over French airfields, and daylight bombing strikes.

Ultimately, the whole idea behind Operation Steinbock was flawed: simple retalition against area bombing was useless, unless it could have been conducted on a scale that was even worse than what Bomber Command did. Such a task was clearly beyond the Luftwaffe's capacity.

Those bombers could have been used to much better effect against the invasion, or on the Eastern Front.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Nick Beale
Steinbock and Enigma
Sat Nov 8 00:44:05 2025
80.225.123.49

If you have a few weeks to spare, try reading the deciphered Enigma traffic for January-April 1944 and see how many messages you can find that give warning of an attack.

I've covered the whole period (admittedly with other topics in mind) and don't recall seeing any. There are a few that detail missions flown, aircraft sent out, how many lost and estimates of bombing results etc. but these are reports AFTER the raids. Generally you wouldn't get much of a picture of the campaign form this source.

My impression is that security in Fl.Kps. IX was very good - maybe they stuck to landline communications because they were on permanent aerodromes and didn't need to rely on radio?

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Graham Boak
Your third point (referring to Michael's message)
Mon Nov 10 10:18:10 2025
20.138.254.2

The Mosquito squadrons were still having to cover the whole of the UK that was under possible threat. A fighter operating out of Catterick would need considerable time to reposition itself over the South Coast.

That still leaves the unknown (to me) problem of the British fighter control. I am quite sure that it was not capable of directing an unlimited number of night fighters. Steinbock raids could have "flooded" the defences restricting potential losses to the number of night fighters under control in the target area (and its approach and exit areas, of course).

That is what I meant to imply about possible changes in tactics. Once it became clear that only the South Coast was under attack, then forces could be moved from more distant areas. An equivalent to the Wilde Sau could have been introduced.

That Steinbock was wasted effort I can only agree with.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Michael
Re: Third Point
Mon Nov 10 16:39:19 2025
207.254.27.131

"The Mosquito squadrons were still having to cover the whole of the UK that was under possible threat. A fighter operating out of Catterick would need considerable time to reposition itself over the South Coast."

Yes, but the ratio of nightfighters to bombers was more advantegous to the RAF, as was the speed and climb of the Mosquito. Great Britain also offers a smaller target than
Germany in its historical borders.

"Steinbock raids could have "flooded" the defences"

That seems unlikely, given the limited Luftwaffe resources - the largest concentracion I have read of (Operation Steinbock appears to hold little interest for authors) were 187 bombers, for an attack on London.

I wonder how effective the German window was against Allied radar, and how much jamming the "Horch- und Stoerstaffeln" achieved.

Also, as the Luftwaffe used the "Y-Verfahren" with its narrow guidance beams and ranging signals, were the Allies able to analyze it, and so discover targets in advance?

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Graham Boak
"Flooding"
Tue Nov 11 10:34:26 2025
20.138.254.2

This would be perfectly conceivable with much less aircraft. As I understand it (and I am certainly open for correction here) the RAF system was comparable to the earlier German one, in that individual night fighters were guided to their individual targets by individual controllers on the ground. There were only a few of those in any one area, so only a limited number of interceptions could occur at any one time. The entire principle of the bomber stream.

I suggest that if you look at a map the effective aerial border between Germany and Britain is the same on both sides of its length. Neither country had aircraft with the capability of "turning" the flanks. If anything, with airfields spread from Brest to Bodo the Luftwaffe had a greater capability of attacking a central target from an unexpected direction. The shape of the curved boundary was to the advantage of the Luftwaffe. Not that they used this to any great extent. It is however a lot nearer from the Luftwaffe's French bomber bases to London or Portsmouth than it is from East Anglia or Yorkshire to Berlin or Kiel.

The ratio of nightfighters to bombers is not terribly important, as long as it is enough. A large number of fighters will be required to defend a country against a small number of bombers, but would cope against much larger forces. For an adequate defense force, more bombers simply means more targets. How they are used is much more important.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Michael
Re: "Flooding"
Tue Nov 11 11:11:01 2025
207.254.27.23

This is turning into a lengthy, speculative discussion on strategy -- I hope we aren't straying of topic. But for your arguments:

I respectfully ask to differ on your statement concerning the "aerial border" between Great Britain and Germany, inluding occupied territories. This border is a rather theoretical affair - what counts are the distances to be covered, and the targets to be approached.

Great Britain is smaller than even what's left of Germany today. Any aerial attacker will find it thus easier to get in and out of enemy airpace, but he will also find British air defence measures be more concentrated around possible targets and avenues of approach. Night fighters, provided they have sufficient performance to reach potential raiders in time, have less territory to cover, and shorter distances to travel from their airfields.

>Not that they used this to any great extent.

Right - Steinbock sorties were flown from Airfields in France and Belgium, so the actual approach paths could not have been that varied.

"It is however a lot nearer from the Luftwaffe's French bomber bases to London or Portsmouth than it is from East Anglia or Yorkshire to Berlin or Kiel."

That point I readily concede - the Luftwaffe bombers flew shorter, but sharply contested raids.

"The ratio of nightfighters to bombers is not terribly important, as long as it is enough."

That statement seems somewhat to contradict itself - how many are "enough"?

"For an adequate defense force, more bombers simply means more targets."

Again, this may appear quite differently if you look at it from the bombers' point of view: for each of them, there were more enemies, and thus more chances of being found, attacked, and destroyed. "Swamping the defences" was not n option, especially since the less experienced Luftwaffe crews were probably less concentrated than a RAF bomber stream.

[Richard T Eger]

From TOCH!:

Nick Beale
Attacking the D-Day build up (referring to Dunash's message)
Wed Nov 5 22:34:13 2025
80.225.113.185

They actually did raid some ports in the latter stages of the campaign including Portsmouth and Falmouth and (IIRC) Torquay (although that may have been minelaying).

Portsmouth was attacked on 16/17 May 1944. weather conditions were worse than expected an, on Fliegerkorps IX's own estimates, "about 50% of bombs considered to have fallen in target area... Concentrated bombing could not be established."